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The Saint Valentine’s decree (1984) and the ensuing hard fought referendum (1985), which 
reduced the automatisms of scala mobile, started a process of redefinition of wage fixing in 
Italy, which culminated with the final abolition of scala mobile (1992) and the approval of 
Protocollo d’intesa (1993). Since then, following New Corporatist principles, a national 
system of centralised wage bargaining (concertazione) and the so-called “institutional 
indexation” have governed the determination of wages. This paper aims to assess the impact 
of such incomes policy agreements on the long and short run equilibrium relationship 
between real wages, labour productivity and unemployment. Different time series 
econometric tools confirm that incomes policy has altered the relationship between real 
wages and productivity, generating not only a permanent downward impact on prices, but 
also on real wages. In a sense, incomes policy has caused a new form of (upward) wage 
rigidity. Interestingly, no impact of incomes policy on the weak relationship between real 
wages and unemployment is detected. The analysis calls for a careful revision of the 1993 
Protocol aimed at: a) better protecting the purchasing power of real wages without losing 
control on inflation; b) introducing growth generating mechanisms. 
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Italy has successfully implemented dramatic disinflation from the two-digit levels 
of the late 1970s and early 1980s down to almost zero in the early 1990s and from then 
on. Of course, disinflation has been the consequence of a complex policy mix, 
including, in addition to incomes policy also more rigorous monetary policy and public 
debt stabilisation. The former, essentially a wage fixing mechanism, has been an 
important (though neglected in the literature) component of the policy mix. In fact, 
while in the 1970s money growth, also through public debt expansion, contributed to 
inflation, nonetheless, the engine of it was a wage-price spiral, exacerbated by scala 
mobile, the mechanism of wage indexation to price inflation. It was introduced in 1945 
in the manufacturing sector and was generalized to all sectors of the economy in 1975. 
As detailed in Section 1, arguably incomes policy started in 1984 with the Saint 
Valentine's decree, confirmed by a hard fought referendum in 1985. They weakened the 
automatisms implicit in scala mobile. An intermediate, key step towards the 
introduction of the new regime of wage fixing was the definitive abolition of scala 
mobile in 1992. The Protocollo d'intesa of 1993 (the Protocol since now) was the 
climax. It put an end to the traditional dramatic social conflict of the 1960s and the 
1970s, when terrorism of opposite political factions brought the country in a dramatic 
social and political situation. It started instead the so-called concertazione between trade 
unions, entrepreneurial organizations and the government around a given inflation 
target. The Protocol  substituted the automatic indexation of scala mobile, with a 
mechanism of "institutional indexation": in other words, workers regain any loss in 
purchasing power due to emerging differences between actual and target inflation only 
at the time when national contracts are renewed. However, this implies a loss of the 
purchasing power of wages for quite a lot of time, the time that is necessary to freeze 
out the dynamics of prices. In other words, disinflation is achieved through (real) wage 
reductions. 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of wage and consumer price inflation over the last 
about forty years. The main dates that will be objet of investigation are marked with a 
dashed line. Scala mobile had its momentum in a period of exceptionally high inflation, 4 
 
when also due to indexation and a strong union power, wage growth almost 
systematically overcame consumer price growth. Instead, in the recent low inflation 
regime, price changes seem to anticipate wage changes, causing sometimes wages to lag 
behind and, therefore, losing their purchasing power. This is especially true in the early 
1990s. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Understanding the impact of wage policy on inflation and, as predicted by new 
Keynesian theory, on unemployment is of paramount importance. Almost two decades 
of application in one of the world leading economies are an important testing ground 
also to verify theoretical predictions about the policy. This notwithstanding, little 
research has been carried out so far on this issue and in particular on the crucial years 
after the introduction of the Euro. This paper aims to contribute to fill in the gap of the 
existing literature. 
The paper applies different tools of time series analysis to study the impact of 
incomes policy on the relationship between real wages, labour productivity and 
unemployment. The main assumption of the empirical analysis is that, as hypothesized, 
among others, in Calmfors and Driffill (1988) and tested in Newell and Symons (1987), 
by introducing a centralized mechanism of wage fixing, incomes policy reduces the 
sensitivity of real wages to productivity growth, at least in the short run. This makes real 
wages fall down to their market clearing level, allowing corporatist countries to reach 
the same result in terms of employment as in countries where bargaining is 
decentralised at the firm level. In the case of Italy, Pastore (1998) attempted to test the 
impact of incomes policy in the aftermath of the signature of the Protocol using for the 
first time cointegration analysis. He found that the policy of de-indexation started in 
1984 was in fact able, on the one hand, to reduce the degree of correlation between real 
wages and productivity in the long run, causing a (possibly) permanent reduction in the 
former, while, on the other hand, increasing the speed at which real wages adjust to 
productivity gains in the short run. In fact, by reducing the impact of inflation on real 
wages, incomes policy makes them adjust more quickly to any disequilibrium in the 
long-run relationship with labour productivity. Costantini and de Nardis (2007) update 
the analysis using quarterly data relative to the years 1981-2006 and find the existence 
of a regime shift in the real wage equation in 1994. They attribute this shift to changes 5 
 
in the system of wage formation and acceleration in the use of temporary work 
arrangements. 
This paper provides further empirical evidence on annual data covering a longer 
period (1970-2008). Annual data allows us also studying the possible impact of a 
number of other variables in the short run equilibrium. After testing that all variables are 
integrated of order one, this study analyses the stability of incomes distribution and 
finds that the share of wages over total national income has dramatically shrank in the 
years after the introduction of the Agreements by about 10 percentage points. This is an 
important factor behind slow economic growth. In addition, the years 1993-1994 are 
endogenously detected by way of the Gregory and Hansen (1996) procedure as years of 
regime change in the parameters of the real wage equation.  
Last, but not least, as noted above, based on New Keynesian theories (Tarantelli, 
1986a; 1986b; Bean, Layard and Nickell, 1986; and, for a textbook explanation, Carlin 
and Soskice, 2005), by reducing real wages incomes policy was expected to reduce 
unemployment. In fact, this is not a direct effect, but an indirect one, which happens 
through the supposed increased competitiveness of the economy in world markets. The 
implicit assumption is that a reduction in real wages is able to increase export to such an 
extent that it should outweigh the reduction in internal demand. It is beyond the aims of 
this paper to study the determinants of unemployment. It is a fact that after 1993 there 
has been a clear trend of increasing employment and shrinking unemployment. What we 
find is indirect confirmation of a changed link between real wages and unemployment. 
In fact, the long- and the short-run elasticity of real wages to changes in the 
unemployment rate switches from positive to statistically insignificant in the after-
Protocol period.  
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section one provides a critical reconstruction 
of the institutional evolution of the process of aggregate wage determination.  Section 
two shortly surveys the theoretical and empirical literature on incomes policy and their 
possible impact on real wages, productivity and unemployment. Section three 
introduces the data adopted in this paper. Section four presents the results of empirical 




Scala mobile was introduced in Italy in December 1945 to protect the purchasing 
power of salaries, wages and pensions in the manufacturing sector from any sudden 
increase in the inflation rate. At the beginning, the automatic indexation had a quarterly 
frequency. Renewal of  national contracts  claimed increases  in real wages to 
improve  workers' economic and social conditions. In 1975,  a historical tripartite 
agreement between Confindustria (national association of entrepreneurs) and the three 
major trade unions, namely CGIL, CISL and UIL extended the system   to all 
other industries. In addition, the frequency of wage increases became monthly
1. 
Soon, though, Modigliani and Padoa Schioppa (1977) blamed the perverse effects 
of the new scala mobile. They claimed that by making wage indexation automatic and 
more frequent, scala mobile had become itself a specific cause of inflation
2. In the 
following years, Tarantelli (1986b) tried to convince politicians, business men and trade 
union leaders of the need to stop the “price rush” suggesting to link wage growth to 
target rather than to actual inflation
3. 
Incomes policy started indeed already in 1984 with the Saint Valentine's decree, 
confirmed by a hard fought referendum in 1985. The head of the government, Bettino 
Craxi, cut four points of indexation converting in law an agreement between 
Confindustria and two major trade unions, CISL and UIL. Since then, a number of laws 
progressively withheld scala mobile.  
An intermediate, key step towards the introduction of what can be considered a 
completely new regime of wage fixing was the ultimate abolition of scala mobile by a 
tripartite agreement in 1992 on "Incomes policy, inflation and the labour cost", 
promoted by the head of the government, Giuliano Amato. It established also that all 
workers should receive a fixed 0.7% wage increase as partial compensation for inflation 
until December 1993. The impact of this agreement was clearly very muscular. It 
                                                 
1 For more accurate reconstructions of the historical background, see, among others, Pastore (1997), 
Fabiani et al. (1998), Baccaro (2000) and the contributions in Acocella and Leoni (2007). 
2 For an in-depth assessment of the actual impact of indexation on wage and price inflation during 
the period 1963-'85, see Destefanis (1995). 
3 On the 27th of March 1985, brigate rosse, a terrorist organization loosely inspired by communist 
ideals, killed Ezio Tarantelli, a scholar of Franco Modigliani and the main theoretician of incomes policy 
in Italy. However, their coward attack could not prevent Tarantelli’s thought to play a decisive role still 
today. 7 
 
certainly contributed to maintain price stability despite the subsequent dramatic 
devaluation of the Italian currency (lira) in September 1993. 
The 1992 Agreement was an essential pre-condition for incomes policy, 
representing the  switch from a conflictualist to a cooperative approach to income 
distribution. In principle, it considered bargaining as a way to keep the purchasing 
power of wages and promote a fairer social distribution of productivity growth.  
The Protocollo d'intesa (Protocol since now) of July 1993, promoted by the head of 
the Government of the time, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, was the climax
4. The agreement 
institutionalized concertazione and formalized collective bargaining introducing a “tax 
based incomes policy”. It also introduced firm level Rappresentanze Sindacali Unitarie 
(Trade Union Representative Units) with the aim to supervise local agreements and 
obtain that they obliged to the targets defined by collective agreements.  
The  Protocol aimed to fight back “stagflation” by implementing price growth' 
control. As Tarantelli (1986b) theorized, wages must be considered a national level 
variable, and be compatible with the aim of containing inflation and, therefore, 
promoting monetary stabilization and growth. Price stability should be considered a 
public good essential for a fairer income distribution and increased international 
competitiveness. Based on this theoretical framework, protecting real wages and 
employment should be the main trade unions’ objective. Overall, the Protocol had three 
main aims: 1) an inflation rate in line with the EU average; 2) a reduction in public 
deficit in line with the EU standards; 3) monetary stability. 
In principle, the new system foresees two bargaining levels, of which level one is 
the industry level bargaining. The wage level is renewed every two years, while the 
normative part of the contract, regarding the general conditions of labour, are renewed 
every four years.  Wage increases should be in line with inflation targets as defined in 
national tripartite agreements with the participation of the government, trade unions and 
entrepreneurial organizations. Level two is the firm' level bargaining.  
The  Protocol introduced what Sylos Labini called "institutional indexation": in 
other words, workers regain any difference between actual and target inflation only 
                                                 
4 Interestingly, the Agreements of the early 1990s were signed without strikes or protests, in a 
completely new climate of industrial relations. Unions showed a remarkable sense of responsibility, 
assuming inflation and unemployment as an integral part of their objective function, together with the 
guarantee of the interests of employed workers. 8 
 
when national contracts are renewed, namely after two years. This implies that wages 
bear the cost of any unexpected inflation via a reduction in purchasing power. In fact, 
institutional indexation has typically involved: a) a systematic positive differential 
between actual and target inflation; b) an increased length of collective labour contracts; 
c) a systematic delay in the renewal of labour contracts; d) and only partial indexation to 
price inflation. 
Unfortunately, several important parts of the Protocol were left unexecuted: a) firm 
level bargaining and the related need to introduce incentives to productivity growth
5; b) 
the promise to trade unions to contribute to the management of social services and other 
aspects of the organisation of the welfare state; c) the need to control also the evolution 
of other types of incomes, especially of rents. 
In 2007, a government led by Romano Prodi signed a new Protocol on Welfare 
which introduced a number of challenging novelties that were never implemented, 
though, because a new government, which came into power few months after the 
signature of the Agreement, withdrew it.  
In February 2009, the Minister of Labour, Maurizio Sacconi, and two major trade 
unions, namely CISL and UIL, signed a new agreement to allow a decentralized system 
of wage bargaining. Tronti (2010) argues that it is a way to achieve a stronger link 
between wages, labour productivity and profits by allowing firm level bargaining to 
take into account cases where labour productivity growth was greater (lower) than the 
national level. In turn, this should work as an incentive for productivity growth at a firm 
level
6.  
Since the Protocol approval, two major changes have affected income distribution. 
First, the well-known rigidities of the Italian labour market have progressively reduced, 
thanks to two-tier labour market reforms. In 1997, the Treu law introduced a new 
discipline of temporary labour contracts and a number of other so-called "atypical" 
                                                 
5 As one of the anonymous referees points out, the very high weight of small and medium-sized 
firms typical of the Italian industrial structure has prevented effective working of a "second bargaining 
level". 
6 CGIL, the trade union with the largest number of members, did not sign the Agreement. Analysis 
of the 2009 Agreement is beyond the aims of this paper. Acocella and Leoni (2010) articulate a lucid 
assessment of the possible impact of the 2009 Agreement on real wages and productivity growth, 
reckoning that the former will be slightly negative and the latter unimportant. The authors also provide a 
number of policy proposals to favour labour productivity growth and therefore cause long-lasting 
increases in the purchasing power of wages. 9 
 
contracts. The law removed most of the constraints that until then had made such 
contracts inconvenient for firms and workers, while introducing, in the meantime, a 
number of new constraints to their inappropriate use. Law n. 30 of 2003 - so-called 
"Biagi law"
7 - with Roberto Maroni as Ministry of Labour introduced a number of new 
types of atypical labour contracts
8, in fact, allowing firms to partly getting around 
previous constraints included in Treu law. Second, wages have been compressed due to 
the need to stabilise massive public debt. The highest tax revenues have drawn 
asymmetrically on salaries, wages and pensions, on the one hand, and on the incomes of 
self-employed, on the other hand, since the former cannot recur to tax evasion and 





The Protocol has caused a regime change in the process of wage determination in 
Italy that allows the prevalence of bargaining on automatic indexation, according to the 
so-called neo-corporatist approach to income policy as defined, among others, in Meade 
(1982), Layard and Nickell (1986) and Tarantelli (1986b). 
Are there testable hypotheses that can be drawn from the historical reconstruction of 
the previous section? First, several dates are in principle candidate to detect a possible 
regime switch in the process of wage determination: 1984 (Saint Valentine's decree), 
1992 (abolition of Scala Mobile); 1993 (the Protocol); 1997 (Treu Law); 2003 (Biagi 
law). Comparing these dates would imply asking whether it was the “de-indexation”, 
incomes policy or two-tier reforms to cause disinflation. The previous analysis suggests 
                                                 
7 On 19th of March 2002 brigate rosse killed Marco Biagi, a labour law scholar at the University of 
Modena and a consultant of the government.  
8 It is far beyond the aims of this paper to provide a full assessment of these laws. In short, it could 
be noted that, although named after Biagi, law n. 30 / 2003 implements only part of the heritage of Biagi, 
as discussed in his White book. The law, in fact, does not include but a minor part of the section of Biagi' 
proposal aimed at introducing some income guarantees for temporary workers during unemployment 
spells and after retirement. Nonetheless, it improved the condition of project workers by substituting the 
old co.co.co. with the new co.co.pro. contract and including some social security provisions in favour of 
project workers.  
9 According to the KRLS Network of Business Ethics, Italy is the country with the highest tax 
evasion in Europe. In the first ten months of 2009, 51.2% of taxable income (about € 389 billions) has 
gone undeclared. This amounts to a tax evasion of € 144 billions per year. In fact, this implies that the tax 
rate of actual tax payer is not the official 43%, but over 50%. 10 
 
that the way itself of implementing incomes policy, and especially the new mechanism 
of institutional indexation, has caused a strong reduction in real wages.  
The second issue is whether incomes policy has had any effect on unemployment as 
predicted by neo-Keynesian theories. In other words, the analysis should address the 
issue whether the unemployment reduction of the 2000s was a consequence of incomes 
policy or of labour market liberalisation. Studying the determinants of unemployment is 
not an aim of this paper, but it will ask whether the policy was able to change the 
elasticity of real wages to unemployment.   
Answering these questions, in turn, implies asking: a) whether incomes policy has 
generated greater coordination in the process of wage fixing in national collective 
contracts; b) and, therefore, whether there has been greater co-movement of wages, 
prices, labour productivity and unemployment in the aggregate. In fact, this paper 






Meade (1982) re-launched incomes policy as a means to fight stagflation and re-
establish the role of expansionary fiscal policy as a tool to fight unemployment. In other 
words, he proposed a neo-Keynesian alternative to the monetarist approach to 
disinflation. He suggests that if the government can achieve monetary stability through 
tripartite agreements with trade unions and entrepreneurial organisations, then aggregate 
demand management can be used again to increase employment. Moreover, once price 
stability is achieved, the economy is able to catch the opportunities of the expansionary 
phase of the business cycle. This is the essence of the neo-corporatist approach to 
disinflation. Interestingly, Meade added that to avoid the distortions that centralised 
wage bargaining might cause in the process of resources' allocation, wage fixing should 
contain some degree of de-centralisation. Real wage growth should equal labour 
productivity growth in every firm / sector to achieve the greatest impact of wage fixing 
on inflation and, indirectly, also on income and employment growth.  11 
 
Tarantelli (1986a; 1986b) applies the theory of public goods to the problem of price 
stability analysing the effects of incomes policy in countries with a centralized level of 
bargaining and in decentralized systems. In the latter, there is a high risk that 
individuals and groups of workers try to avoid paying the cost of wage and price 
stability by implementing a free riding behaviour. Small unions, for instance, do not 
accept lower wage requests and, by doing so, their workers benefit of higher relative 
wages without an increase in the average inflation rate. The more decentralized is the 
system, the greater is the number of agents who will try to free ride. The cumulative 
effect is higher inflation, higher unemployment and lower average real wages. This 
result is not Pareto-optimal. A more centralized system of industrial relations carries 
with it a lower risk of wage free riding and greater price stability. Decentralized 
countries are less credible and more easily blocked by small trade unions. According to 
Tarantelli, centralization and decentralization are not alternative models. They might 
reinforce each other. In countries with a centralized system of wage fixing, incomes 
policy is a solution for the macro regulation of inflation and unemployment. However, 
once reached the macro-level agreement, trade unions’ market power can define the 
plant level rules. Achieving this marriage of opposites is very difficult , though, as the 
case of Italy proves. 
Calmfors and Driffil (1988, p. 15) investigate the effects of the degree of 
centralization of wage setting on macroeconomic performance. They study centralized 
systems, such as Germany, Belgium and the Nordic countries; decentralized systems 
with real wage flexibility, such as Canada and the USA; and countries with an 
intermediate degree of centralization. They find  that low unemployment is obtained 
either because of heavy centralization, which is conducive to real wage restraints, or 
because of far-reaching decentralization, which is characterized by real wage flexibility. 
Conversely, in countries with an intermediate degree of centralization, the 
unemployment rate is higher. This is the so-called hump-shaped curve of wage 
bargaining. The ratio is that, in corporatist countries, large trade unions recognize their 
market power and take into account both the inflationary and unemployment effect of 
wage increases. Conversely, unions operating only at a firm level have little market 
power and cannot affect the market clearing level of wages. In intermediate cases, 12 
 
unions exert a market power but do not consider the macroeconomic implications of 
their actions.  
 Bean, Layard and Nickell (1986) estimated wage equations using time series data 
relative to 18 OECD countries. The differences in the estimated wage and employment 
equations depend both on demand factors and on real wage differentials. Especially in 
the European Union, a reduction in the aggregate demand is one of the major causes of 
unemployment rising. Second, supply-side factors play a significant role in wage 
equations influencing the size of unemployment. Third, structural differences in labour 
markets are related to the institutional context and bargaining level of a country. In 
more corporatist countries wage adjustment is faster.  
Newell and Symons (1987) focus on the impact of incomes policy on 
unemployment and show that corporatism produces a wage outcome lower than it 
would have been in decentralized countries. They analyze the wage equations of 5 
countries (Sweden, Germany, Britain, Japan and the USA), trying to associate the 
average level of unemployment to the specific country market institutions. They find 
that in centralized countries incomes policy increases the sensitivity of real wages to 
unemployment. They argue that reducing real wages is a way to prevent unemployment 
growth in periods of economic downturn. They have in mind an aggregate labour 
demand curve: lower real wages imply lower labour costs for firms and therefore more 
employment. In some neo-keynesian formulations of incomes policy, including 
Tarantelli (1986a), the reduction of unemployment is achieved through increased 
international competitiveness.  
Dolado and Jimeno (1997), use a structural VAR methodology in five variables 
(output, employment, wage, price and unemployment) associating different causes of 
unemployment in Spain with shocks of different nature. They study the impact of five 
structural shocks (aggregate demand, wage-push, price-push, productivity and labour 
supply shocks) with impulse-response functions. In particular, they find that wage 





Little research has been done to assess the impact of incomes policy on the Phillips 
curve in Italy. Pastore (1998) developed, in the context of cointegration analysis, some 
intuitions of Newell and Symons (1987). They assumed that incomes policy tends to 
reduce the sensitivity of real wages to labour productivity growth and to re-establish the 
negative sign of the elasticity of real wages to unemployment. Pastore (1998) applied 
the Engle and Granger (1987) procedure using annual data from 1951 to 1995. An 
advantage of this approach is that it provides a direct measure of wage flexibility, 
defined as the coefficient of residuals of the long run equation, used as a regressor in the 
short run equation. The error correction mechanism, sometimes called the feedback 
mechanism, measures the speed of adjustment of real wages to their long-term 
equilibrium value.  
The analysis suggests stability of income distribution in the long run, but also a 
tendency of wages to overcome labour productivity during part of the period. To test for 
the impact of incomes policy, in the short run, the author interacts the residuals from the 
long run estimates with a dummy equal to one for the period 1985-1995, when 
indexation was gradually withdrawn. He finds that the speed of adjustment of real 
wages to their equilibrium path increased in the same period by about 20 percent. 
Finally, there seems to be no change in the relationship between real wages and 
unemployment, suggesting either that other forms of labour market flexibility, such as 
numerical flexibility, were necessary or that more time was needed to see the restoration 
of a competitive principle in the process of wage determination. 
Using the same data, Golinelli (1998) finds a stable relationship between variations 
in real wages and the unemployment rate in the short run using an error correction 
model characterized be a non linear correction of the error.  
Fabiani et al. (2001) provide further evidence that incomes policy agreements were 
conducive to a period of wage moderation. In the long term, instead, the absence of 
indexation and the new two-year bargaining system have increased the inertia of 
nominal wages. Applying a methodology similar to Dolado and Jimeno (1997), the 
authors investigate the causes of unemployment in a small structural VAR. In the short 
term, “wage push” shocks do not seem to have contributed to the worsening of 
unemployment; on the contrary, productivity shocks play a significant role in explaining 14 
 
unemployment movements. In the long run they found the absence of the effects of 
these non demand factors. 
Destefanis, Mastromatteo and Verga (2005) analyse the effects of the 1992 and 
1993 agreements on inflation for two-digit industry real wage equations. They find that 
the target rate of inflation has an impact on the formation of expected inflation over the 
period 1992-’96, but they find a negligible effect of the agreements on the relationship 
between labour productivity and real wages. 
Costantini and de Nardis (2007) focus on the impact of labour market reforms on 
real wage equations using quarterly observations from 1981 to 2006. They use the 
Gregory and Hansen (1996) residual based test for cointegration to find any structural 
break in the long run relationship between real wages, labour productivity and 
unemployment. They actually find that 1994 is a year of regime shift, which they 
interpret as a switch from high to low equilibrium unemployment. They compare 
parameter elasticities before and after the break and find that the responsiveness of real 
wages to the unemployment rate substantially increased from -0.136 to -0.262. In 
addition, the elasticity of real wages to labour productivity goes near to one-to-one in 
the long run.  
It is also worth mentioning that Devicienti et al. (2008) also find the re-emergence 
of a wage curve effect - meaning a negative coefficient of monthly wages with respect 
to local unemployment - in the post-1993 period, pointing to increased wage flexibility 
which they attribute to the new regime of industrial relations. 
3. The data 
 
The analysis is based on annual data from 1970 to 2008. This is an important 
difference with respect to Costantini and De Nardis (2006), who use quarterly data 
relative to 1980-2006. Taking annual data for a longer period may indeed be an 
advantage in two ways: (a) as Pierse and Snell (1995) note, in cointegration analysis, 
having more years is at a premium vis-à-vis having a larger number of higher frequency 
data; (b) it is easier to find annual data relative to other variables such as trade union 
density, the gap between consumer prices and value added deflator, the gap between 15 
 
import prices and value added deflator, and some measure of the tax wedge
10. The 
possible impact of these variables on the short-run equilibrium real wage is tested.  
The variables' definition is standard. The real wage (WR) is measured as the ratio of 
per capita nominal wage and the consumer prices index (CPI). The former is obtained, 
in turn, as a ratio of the earnings of wage employees (RLD), nominal values, over the 
number of wage employees in thousands of units (ULD). The consumer price index CPI 
is the ratio of the nominal family expenditure (CN), at current prices, and the real family 
expenditure (CR), values at constant prices. Labour productivity (LP) is given by the 
ratio between real GDP (GDPR), at constant prices of the base year 2000, and total 
employment (ULT), in thousands of total labour units. The unemployment rate (u) is the 
ratio of the number of the unemployed (UN) and the labour force (LF), values in 
thousands of total units of labour. Trade union density (TUD) is the share of wage 
employees that are trade union members. The gap between consumer price index and 
value added deflator is measured as (CPI - P). The gap between import prices and value 
added deflator is (PM - P). The ratio of total labour taxes (TLT) over the earnings of 
wage employees is a measure of the tax wedge on labour (TWEDGE)Tables A.1 in the 
Appendix provides a full definition and source of all the variables used in the analysis. 
They are taken from the National Account as provided by ISTAT, except for the 
unemployment rate and trade union density, which are drawn from the OECD data base. 
Variables at constant prices are expressed in terms of the prices of the base year 2000. 
All variables are in natural logarithms. Percentage changes are computed by means of 
logarithmic differences. 
Before implementing cointegration analysis, we enquire variables for their order of 
integration. First, panel (a) and (b) of Figure 2 plot the variables at levels and at first 
differences, respectively. Note that in panel (a) the unemployment rate is measured on 
the right side due to strong differences. Real wages tend to become flat starting from the 
early 1990s, with the growth rate fluctuating around zero and accumulating several 
negative values since then. The percentage change of the unemployment rate tends to be 
negative starting from the late 1990s, causing an important reduction from 11.7% in 
1998 down to 6.1% in 2007. Low labour productivity growth from the early 1990s 
suggests that two-tier labour market reforms have contributed to employment growth, at 
                                                 
10 I thank one of the referees for this remark. 16 
 
least in part. In fact, according to ISTAT data, about one out of three new jobs created 
over the years from 1997 to 2008 has been temporary. An additional component has 
been due to the legalisation of irregular migrants. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Table 1 reports the ADF test statistics for the variables of interest at levels and at 
first-differences
11. The critical values are provided in the last row of the table. The test 
statistics in Panel (a) in correspondence to the highest values of the reported information 
criteria (in bold) can never reject the null of non-stationarity, while those selected in 
Panel (b) do reject the null, confirming that the variables are I(1).  
[Table 1 about here] 
As a robustness check, we implement also the Phillips and Perron test, which is 
more sensitive to the presence of structural breaks in the data, and the DF-GLS, which 
has more power than the previous tests. In addition, we provide also results of the Zivot 
and Andrews (1992) test in the case when shifts in both the intercept and trend are 
allowed. This procedure estimates the test statistics for each observation, assuming the 
existence of possible structural breaks in the data, and provides the minimum value of 
these statistics
12. All the tests, reported in Table 2, confirm that the variables are I(1), 
not rejecting the null of a unit root when the estimates refer to levels and rejecting it 
when they refer to first-differences. The table adds also tests for the other variables, 
such as trade union density, the wedge, and PPM and the CPIGAP.  
[Table 2 about here] 
4. Results 
 
Once checked that all variables are I(1), we proceed by estimating the so-called 
WPYE model (Alogoskoufis and Smith, 1991). It implies testing the null of “no-
cointegration” between real wages and labour productivity. In other words, we aim to 
verify whether the relationship WPYE, obtained as (wages – prices – output + 
employment), is stable in the long run with the following coefficients: (+1, -1, -1, +1). 
                                                 
11 Since OLS detects the presence of a constant and / or a trend in all variables, either at levels or at 
differences, we report the tests with intercept and trend. 
12 For shortness' sake, we do not discuss in detail such tests. A more in-depth discussion can be 
found in recent handbooks of time series analysis.  17 
 
This would imply that real wages and labour productivity cointegrate with coefficients 
(1, -1) and therefore that the share of labour income over output is stable over time. If 
the series WPYE contains a unit root, the underlying variables do not cointegrate; vice 
versa, if the series does not contain a unit root, then the variables cointegrate. In other 
words, cointegration implies testing the variable WPYE for the presence of a unit root. 
Figure 3 plots the WPYE series before transformation in logarithms, so that the 
figures can be read directly as the labour share of GDP. Clearly, a dramatic downward 
shift in the series from about 68% down to a low of 57% happens in the early 1990s. 
This is a dramatic loss, with potentially important effects also on economic growth, 
considering the higher propensity to consume of labour incomes. It appears particularly 
strong in per capita terms, if one considers that, after a brawny reduction in employment 
and corresponding increase in unemployment due to the 1991 recession, starting from 
1995 the employment rate has increased and the unemployment rate has reduced until 
recently
13.  
[Figure 3 about here] 
Overall, this finding is suggestive of the hypothesis that real wages have grown at a 
much slower pace than labour productivity in recent years
14. Nonetheless, it is worth 
noticing that apart from the years 1991-'95, when it undergoes a dramatic reduction, the 
labour share is stable. In other words, real wages and labour productivity seem to have 
the expected unitary coefficients both until 1990 and from 1995 on. This is either 
evidence of a non-stationarity or of a structural break. In any case, unit root tests might 
tend to suggest non-stationarity.  
In fact, results reported in Table 3 from different unit root tests on WPYE provide 
evidence of a structural break in the data. The ADF test, based on a model with a 
constant, but no trend (the labour share of national income is expected to be 
untrended)
15 clearly cannot reject the null of non-stationarity. A similar conclusion is 
reached using a Phillips and Perron (1988) and the DF-GLS test. The Zivot and 
                                                 
13 Blanchard (2006, Figure 14a) finds something similar in the case of France. He notes that the 
labour share, which had gone up by five percentage points from 1970 to 1981, then went down by 12 
percentage points from 1980 to the early 2000s; it has remained roughly at that level since. 
14 This depends also on the fact that the Protocol does not foresee mechanisms to equalise real wage 
growth and productivity growth (see Acocella and Leoni, 2010; and Tronti, 2010). 
15 Adding a trend to the test tends to return stationarity in some cases.  18 
 
Andrews (1992) test cannot reject the null of a unit root at the 1%, but at the 5% 
significance level. Figure 4 reproduces the results of the ZA test for the share of wage 
employment over GDP. It clearly shows that in 1994 the test statistics undergoes a 
dramatic reduction. 
[Table 3 and Figure 4 about here] 
This is overwhelming evidence of the fact that the labour share has shrunk over the 
considered period. However, the question arises as to the causes of the emergence of a 
structural break. Is it because of a shift down in the series, which has left unaltered the 
one-to-one relationship between real wages and labour productivity? Or is it because of 
a change in the relationship between these two variables? A first answer to these 
questions comes from observation of the scatter of real wages and labour productivity in 
Figure 5. It shows that the relationship between the two variables looks one-to-one only 
until the early 1990s, when real wages stop growing in presence of (very slow) labour 
productivity growth. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
To control for the presence of a structural break in the data, we add a dummy 
variable (D1993), which equals one in the years after 1993, to a DF type of test. The 
dummy is statistically significant with a coefficient that suggests a ceteris paribus 
reduction in the log of the labour share on national income of about 5% in the period of 
interest. Interestingly, the t-statistics of the lagged labour share, computed using 
Newey-West HAC standard errors, now equals -4.5, suggesting that the series is 
stationary once controlling for the presence of a shift. This finding might be taken as an 
indirect test that incomes policy has changed the process of wage determination. 
The results of the Engle and Granger procedure relative to the three variables of 
interest, including the unemployment rate, provide evidence which concurs to reinforce 
previous findings
16. The long-run estimates do not generate stationary residuals, as 
expected in case of cointegration, but the corresponding cointegration test on the 
residuals increases dramatically when the dummy D1993 is included. Table 4 reports 
the results of estimates of the long-run relationship and of the cointegration test, namely 
the ADF test on the residuals of each long run equation. Both the estimate without 
                                                 
16 Unreported results of Johansen cointegration tests (available on request) consistently point to the 
existence of only one cointegrating vector among the variables under consideration.  19 
 
(model 1) and with the income policy dummy (model 2) are reported. Model (3) 
interacts the policy dummy with each determinant of real wages. It is apparent that only 
in the case of model (2) and (3) the test statistics selected based on the highest value of 
the AIC and SBC information criteria rejects the null of non-stationary residuals, and 
only at the 10% significance level.  
[Table 4 about here] 
Interestingly, in model (2) of Table 4 the elasticity of real wages to labour 
productivity is higher. This finding is reinforced in model (3), where clear signs of a 
regime shift are detected. In other words, once controlling for the downward bias of real 
wages in the period after de-indexation, real wages reach an elasticity of almost one. 
The sign of the unemployment rate is positive and statistically significant in model (1). 
In model (2) and (3), the unemployment rate is not statistically significant. This is 
already an important change in the (perverse) relationship between real wages and 
unemployment typical of the previous period already noted in Costantini and De Nardis 
(2006), who find the re-emergence of a negative sign, and Devicienti et al. (2008), who 
see a resurrection of the wage curve.  Figure 6 shows that the Phillips curve, expressed 
here in terms of real (not nominal) wage changes, is highly unstable. Disinflation has 
shifted it back to the left allowing the country to move on what Costantini and De 
Nardis (op. cit.) call a low unemployment regime. 
[Figure 6 about here] 
A test similar to that in model (3) of Table 4 consists of estimating two different 
equations in the pre- and post-reform period. Table 5 reports first step estimates of the 
Engle and Granger procedure run on the two sub-samples relative to the pre- and post-
reform period. The small number of observations available suggests taking these 
estimates with the due caveats, since the super-consistency property of estimates 
involving cointegrating relationships does not apply in the case of small samples (Stock, 
1987). Nonetheless, it is worth perhaps reporting these findings. While in the pre-reform 
period there was a one-to-one relationship between real wages and labour productivity, 
instead after the reform there is a statistically significant negative coefficient, suggesting 
that institutional indexation has reduced the elasticity of real wages to productivity 
growth. The traditional negative correlation with the unemployment rate is re-
established in the post-reform period, although with a low elasticity. 20 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
The short run estimates, reported in Table 6, are based on the residuals of models 
presented in Table 4. Model (1) and (2) in Table 6 are based on residuals of estimates in 
model (1) and (3) of Table 4, respectively. The dependent variable is the percentage rate 
of growth of real wages. Lagged residuals appear as a regressor together with lagged 
values of the dependent and independent variables as well as of other variables that 
might affect the short run dynamics
17. In both cases, labour productivity growth and 
changes in the unemployment rate do not affect wage growth.  Few variables are 
statistically significant in model (1), while the error correction mechanism is weak. The 
latter appears stronger in model (2), where also other regressors become statistically 
significant.  
Next issue consists of asking whether incomes policy has affected the adjustment 
mechanism. Assuming that, by implementing collective agreements and, therefore, 
increasing the degree of centralisation of wage fixing, incomes policy should increase 
the speed to which real wages adapt to changes in labour productivity, then the 
coefficient of lagged residuals should increase in absolute value. In a sense, this would 
point to an increase in the degree of wage and, hence, of labour market flexibility. In a 
way comparison of model (1) and (2) in Table 6 already confirms this. An additional 
test consists of estimating the short run equation in Table 6 using the residuals for the 
pre- and post-transition real wage equations presented in Table 5. Two (unreported) 
estimates have been run. The first one includes only labour productivity and 
unemployment. It yields an error correction mechanism of -0.46. When using all the 
regressor in Table 6, the coefficient of the residuals equals -0.79. The corresponding 
coefficients for the post-reform period equal -0.89 and -2.04. The latter values are both 
higher than that found in previous research relative to older data (Pastore, 1997).   
[Table 6 about here] 
Overall, the previous analysis provides circumstantial evidence to suggest that 
incomes policy has increased the degree of labour market flexibility leading to a 
dramatic real wage reduction.  
                                                 
17 The specifications reported in the table are the result of large experimentation and have been 
selected based on several information criteria and other diagnostic tests, as suggested by the general-to-
specific approach. 21 
 
A further issue is whether we can confirm that the regime change has happened 
after implementation of incomes policy. The Gregory and Hansen (1996, p. 101) 
approach can be seen as a multivariate extension of the univariate unit root ZA test used 
to detect the presence of structural breaks. It is used to test the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration against the alternative of cointegration in the presence of a regime shift. 
All three types of models conceived in Gregory and Hansen are considered for 
comparative purposes in Table 7. While the ADF statistics reject the null of unit root, 
the ZA statistics is less conclusive. All tests, though, detect the early 1990s as the years 
when the structural break takes place.  
[Table 7 about here] 
Table 8 provides Gregory and Hansen' types of estimates of the parameters of the 
Italian Phillips curve considering also different ways in which the structural break could 
take place. Interestingly, the parameters estimated using Gregory and Hansen are very 
similar to those estimated in the first step of the Engle and Granger procedure. In model 
(2), once controlling for the presence of a trend shift, the elasticity of real wages to 
labour productivity is greatly increased. Model (3) seems to detect a regime shift in the 
relationship between real wages and unemployment. After the break, which is 
endogenously found to happen in 1991, the coefficient of unemployment becomes 
statistically insignificant, as in model (3) of Table 4. 
[Table 8 about here] 
Discussion and policy implications 
 
In a decade or so, Italy has moved from being one of the EU countries with the 
highest to one with the lowest inflation rate. Incomes policy has been an important 
component of the policy mix used to achieve disinflation. It started with the progressive 
abolition of scala mobile and its substitution with the so-called institutional indexation 
in the early 1990s. In other words, nominal wages should adjust to the gap between 
actual and target inflation only when national contracts are renewed, every two years, or 
even after more than two years in the very common case of late contract renewal. 
The econometric analysis carried out in this paper shows that starting from the time 
of implementation of the new indexation mechanism, real wages have grown at a slower 22 
 
pace than labour productivity. It implied a dramatic reduction, by slightly less than 10 
percentage points of the labour share over GDP. Different statistical tests, including the 
Gregory and Hansen' (1996) one, point to a regime change in the relationship between 
real wages, labour productivity and unemployment in the early 1990s, the time when the 
Protocol was implemented. Variables appear to cointegrate using the Engle and Granger 
procedure only when a dummy for 1993 is included in the estimates alone or interacted 
with other variables. 
The main conclusion of this study is that incomes policy has increased the degree of 
labour market flexibility, meant here as the speed at which real wages turn to their long-
run equilibrium value, but not the sensitivity of real wages to productivity growth. In 
fact, in the post-reform period, real wages tend not to follow productivity growth any 
more. In a sense, incomes policy has caused an unprecedented form of (upward) wage 
rigidity and a dramatic reduction in real terms. 
This is partly in line with theoretical predictions (see Calmfors and Driffil (1988) 
and Newell and Symons (1987). However, it is also related to the inefficient way of 
working of "institutional indexation". Indexation to the gap between actual and target 
inflation has happened only too late and partially. In addition, the loss of purchasing 
power of wages has happened in a period of highest tax burden on wages to stabilise a 
dramatic public debt and of increasing prices of some primary goods whose weight on 
the budget of low income people is high after the introduction of the Euro. In turn, the 
real wage stagnation has most likely contributed to the recent slowdown in economic 
growth experienced in recent years. 
The analysis has important policy implications. Above all, it is necessary to tackle 
the main issue at stake in this paper: new rules are necessary to avoid the progressive 
erosion of the purchasing power of wages due to inflation. There are different ways of 
doing so: a) rendering any gap between actual and expected inflation yearly and 
automatically; b) introducing some kind of tax penalty for any delay in the signature of 
national contracts; c) rendering the fiscal drag to wage employees. Other not less 
important policy interventions include the fight against tax evasion and an increase in 
the degree of competitiveness in goods markets. These interventions are key to a 
strategy whose aim is to increase the competitiveness (and therefore the growth 
prospects) of the country in the long run.  23 
 
According to Acocella and Leoni (2010), the aforementioned 2009 Agreement does 
not include arrangements sufficient to protect the purchasing power of wages. They 
forecast further wage reductions as a consequence of the implementation of this 
Agreement ranging from -0.11% to -0.67 % per year. In addition, the Agreement does 
not include sufficient incentives to increase labour productivity which has remained 




The Saint Valentine's decree (1984) and the ensuing hard fought referendum 
(1985), which reduced the automatisms of scala mobile, started a process of redefinition 
of wage fixing in Italy, which culminated with the final abolition of scala mobile (1992) 
and the approval of Protocollo d'intesa (1993). Since then, following New Corporatist 
principles, a national system of centralised wage bargaining (concertazione) and the so-
called "institutional indexation" have governed the determination of wages.  
This paper aims to assess the impact of such incomes policy agreements on the long 
and short run equilibrium relationship between real wages, labour productivity and 
unemployment. Different time series econometric tools, including the Engle and 
Granger and the Gregory and Hansen procedures confirm that incomes policy has 
altered the relationship between real wages and productivity, generating not only a 
permanent downward impact on prices, but also on real wages. In a sense, incomes 
policy has caused a new form of (upward) wage rigidity. In addition, incomes policy 
has changed the elasticity of real wages to the unemployment rate from positive to 
statistically insignificant, mirroring the recent reduction in the unemployment rate.  
The analysis also confirms theoretical expectations regarding the increased 
elasticity of real wages to their equilibrium value as measured by the coefficient of 
lagged residuals in the short run real wage equation, which has increased from -0.46 in 
the pre-reform to -0.79 in the post-reform period. The Zivot and Andrews (1992) unit 
root test on the labour share and the Gregory and Hansen (2006) cointegration tests 
applied to the real wage equation concur to endogenously point to the early 1990s, and 
especially 1994, as the year of the regime shift. 
                                                 
18 For a more optimistic view on the 2009 agreement, see Tronti (2010). 24 
 
The analysis calls for a careful revision of the 1993 Protocol aimed at: a) better 
protecting the purchasing power of real wages without losing control on inflation; b) 
introducing growth generating mechanisms. 
Future developments of this research will focus on disentangling the impact of 
incomes policy vis-à-vis other policy interventions, namely monetary policy and labour 
market liberalisation on prices and unemployment respectively. This is essential to 
prove causality. This implies also adding more variables, including trade union density, 
to the theoretical framework adopted in the paper. In addition, the analysis of the impact 
of wage policy on individual pay using disaggregated data is expected to shed new light 
on the actual impact of incomes policy on the link between real wages and labour 
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Table 1. The Dickey-Fuller test statistics for level and first-difference variables 
  Panel (a): Levels 
Variables  LWR LPL  LU 
 t-stat  AIC  SBC  t-stat  AIC  SBC  t-stat  AIC  SBC 
DF  -1.89 96.33 94.04 .14  93.93  91.64  -1.08 50.53 48.24 
ADF (1)  -1.91  95.52  92.46  .38  93.18  90.13  -1.54 50.45 47.40 
ADF (2)  -1.96  94.94  91.12  .58  92.45  88.64  -.93 50.24  46.43 
ADF (3)  -1.91  93.94  89.37  .73  91.67  87.10  -1.19 49.72 45.14 
ADF (4)  -1.99  93.47  88.13  1.14  91.71  86.37  -.83 48.91  43.58 
Critical value  -3.55 
  Panel (b): First-differences 
Variables  DLWR DLPL  DLU 
 t-stat  AIC  SBC  t-stat  AIC  SBC  t-stat  AIC  SBC 
DF  -5.25 94.57 92.28 ‐6.14  94.10  91.81  -5.80 50.15 47.86 
ADF (1)  -3.34  93.82  90.77  ‐4.59  93.26  90.20  -5.86 50.75 47.69 
ADF (2)  -2.92  92.86  89.04  ‐3.88  92.36  88.54  -3.88 49.89 46.07 
ADF (3)  -2.89  92.14  87.56  ‐3.75  91.91  87.33  -3.93 49.49 44.90 
ADF (4)  -3.25  92.34  87.00  ‐2.43  91.67  86.33  -3.59 48.58 43.24 
Critical value  -3.55 
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Table 2. PP, DF-GLS and Zivot and Andrews unit root tests  
  Panel (a): Variables at levels 
Variables ADF  PP  DF-GLS  ZA 
LWR    -2.83  -1.10 (0)  -4.57 (1990) 
LPL    -0.23  -0.36 (1)  -3.63 (1994) 
LU   -020  -1.21(1)  -2.202  (1986) 
TUD -0.05  -0.72  -1.12(1)  -5.45  (1984) 
TWEDGE -1.92  -1.97  -1.93(0)  -3.36  (1989) 
PPM -1.54  -1.66  -1.55  (0)  -1.85(1986) 
CPIGAP  -1.59  -1.34  -1.40 (1)  -2.59 (1979) 
Critical Values 1%  -3.62  -4.22  -3.77  -5.57 
  Panel (b): Variables at differences 
Variables ADF  PP  DF-GLS  ZA 
DLWR    -5.97 ***  -4.45 (0) ***  -6.54 (1993) *** 
DLPL    -6.13 ***  -6.15 (0) ***  -7.035 (1984) *** 
DLU    -4.58 ***  -4.60 (0) ***  -6.167 (1988) *** 
TUD  -3.29**  -3.14**  -2.30 (0) **  -6.49 (1984) *** 
TWEDGE  -6.33***  -6.40***  -6.40 (0) ***  -7.73 (1998) ***  
PPM  -5.12***  -5.07***  -5.18 (0) ***  -5.60 (1986) *** 
CPIGAP  -3.40**  -3.39**  -3.43 (0) **  NO BREAK 
Critical Values 1%  -3.62  -4.22  -3.77  -5.57 
Notes: i) the PP is computed using the Bartlett Kernel with automatic Newey-West bandwidth selection 
(Newey and West 1994); ii) the DF-GLS test is computed with the number of lags chosen using the SBC 





Table 3. Unit root tests for the labour share of national income 
Variable  ADF  PP  DF-GLS  ZA (1)  
 Levels 








Critical Values 1%  -3.62  -3.62  -2.63  -5.57 (1%) and -5.08 (5%) 
Notes: The ADF test is computed using the SBC as an automatic selection criterion of the maximum 
number of lags (reported between brackets). For the other test statistics, see the note under table 2. In 
addition, ZA (1) represents the case with intercept only and ZA (2) the case with intercept and trend. The 




Table 4. First step of the Engle and Granger procedure, overall sample 
Dependent variable  Real wages 
Variables (1)  (2)  (3) 
Constant 1.076***  -0.450*  -0.462 
Labour productivity  0.588***  0.801***  0.998*** 
Unemployment rate  0.083***  0.567**  -0.032 
D1993   -0.09***  4.368*** 
D1993*Labour productivity      -1.159*** 
D1993*Unemployment rate      -0.084 
  Cointegration test on the residuals of the above models 
  t-stat  AIC SBC t-stat  t-stat  AIC SBC AIC SBC 
DF -1.81  87.79  87.03  -3.09 84.61 83.85 -4.75 99.96 99.20 
ADF (1)  -2.36  88.50  86.98  -2.65 83.62 82.09 -3.35 99.36 97.83 
ADF (2)  -2.47  87.86  85.57  -2.37 82.62 80.33 -2.70 98.45 96.16 
ADF (3)  -2.63  87.33  84.28  -3.13 83.99 80.94 -2.76 97.80 94.75 
ADF (4)  -2.92  87.27  83.45  -4.34 87.17 83.35 -3.58 99.72 95.90 
Critical value at 5% 
significance level 




Table 5. First step of the Engle and Granger procedure, subsamples 
Variables 1970-1992    1993-2008   
Dependent variable    Real wages      Real wages   
Constant   -0.462      3.906***   
Labour productivity    0.998***      -0.161   
Unemployment rate    -0.318    -0.040**   
  Cointegration test on the residuals of the above models 
 t-stat  AIC  SBC  t-stat  AIC  SBC 
DF -3.36  49.51  49.06  -5.55  40.20  40.00 
ADF (1)  -2.24  49.04  48.15  -3.74  39.42  39.02 
ADF (2)  -1.75  48.14  46.81  -3.31  38.78  38.18 
ADF (3)  -1.84  47.44  45.66  -3.17  38.45  37.66 
ADF (4)  -2.81  49.65  47.42  -4.05  39.93  38.93 
Critical value  -4.25  -4.61 
 
 
Table 6. Second step of the Engle and Granger procedure 
Variables (1)  (2) 
Dependent variable  DLWR  DLWR 
Constant -0.009  -0.042 
D1993 -0.021**  -0.0194** 
DLP(-1) -0.008  -0.147 
DLU(-1) -0.082  -0.026 
TUD(-1) 0.002*  0.002** 
TWEDGE(-1) -0.151  0.050 
PPM(-1) -0.038  -0.090* 
DLPPM(-1) -0.052  -0.087*** 
CPIGAP(-1) 0.029  0.435*** 
DLCPIGAP(-1) 0.000  0.001 
R(-1) -0.266**  -0.725*** 
DW 2.15  2.01 
Adj-R
2 0.42  0.61 
Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent coefficient of covariance. White correction. The lagged residual in 




Table 7. Gregory and Hansen (1996) cointegration tests 
Model ADF  Procedure  Phillips  Procedure 
 ADF  Lags  Break  ZA  statistics Break ZT  statistics Break 
(1) Level shift  -4.85
**  0  1994 -26.28  1994 -4.44
* 1994 
(2) Level shift with trend  -5.09
**  0  1993 -29.29  1993 -4.80
* 1993 
(3) Regime shift  -5.50
*** 0  1992 -30.96  1991 -5.07
** 1991 
Note: The type of model is based on Gregory Hansen (1996, p. 103). H0: no cointegration in the 
case with a structural break in the level (1), in the level and trend (2) and in the case of a regime 
shift (3). The critical values for the ADF and ZT statistics are at the 1 significance level: -5.13 
(model 1), -5.45 (model 2) and -5.47 (model 3); at the 5% significance level: -4.61 (model 1), -
4.99 (model 2) and -4.95 (model 3). The critical value for the ZA statistics are at the 10% 
significance level: -36.19 (model 1), -43.22 (model 2) and -41.85 (model 3).  
* means significant at 10% level; ** at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 31 
 
Table 8. Gregory and Hansen (1996) estimates of the real wage equation 
Variables (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent variable  WR  WR  WR 
Constant -1.673***  -0.400  2.024*** 
LP 0.524***  0.883***  0.459*** 
LU 0.145***  0.122***  0.192*** 
Constant*Dbreak 0.020  0.043  1.426 
Trend     -0.006  0.164 
LPL*Dbreak     -0.18 
LU*Dbreak     -0.232 
Note: Model (1) refer to a model with a level shift; Model (2) to a model with a level shift with trend; 
Model (3) to a model with regime shifts (Gregory and Hansen, 1996, p. 103). The Dbreak is a dummy 
variable taking a value of 1 for the years after the break detected, as reported in Table 7.  

















































































Note: In Panel (a), variables are not in natural logarithms. The level of real wages and labour productivity are measured on the left axis, whereas the 
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Table A.1. Variables definition 
Name   Description  Source 
CN  Family expenditure, values at current prices (millions of Euros from 1999 on; 
millions of Euros / Italian lire for earlier years). 
ISTAT 
CR  Family expenditure, values at constant prices of the base year 2000 (millions of 
Euros from 1999 on; millions of Euros / Italian lire for earlier years). 
ISTAT 
CPI  Consumer price index = CN / CR   
GDP  Production at inputs’ costs, values at current prices (millions of Euros from 1999 
on; millions of Euros / Italian lire for earlier years), total. 
ISTAT 
GDPR  Production at inputs’ costs, base year 2000 (millions of Euros from 1999 on; 
millions of Euros / Italian lire for earlier years), total. 
ISTAT 
P  GDP deflator = GDP / GDPR   
CPIGAP  Gap between consumer prices and value added deflator = CPI - P   
M  Import of goods and services, values at current prices (millions of Euros from 
1999 on; millions of Euros / Italian lire for earlier years). 
 
MR  Import of goods and services, values at constant prices of the base year 2000 
(millions of Euros from 1999 on; millions of Euros / Italian lire for earlier years). 
 
PM  Import prices = M - MR   
PPM  Gap between import prices and value added deflator = PM - P   
EM  Employed, total unit of labour (in thousands).  OCSE 
UN  Unemployed, total unit of labour (in thousands).  OCSE 
LF  Labour force = EM + UN.   
U   Unemployment rate = (UN / LF). 
  OCSE  
RLD  Gross wage and salary earnings, nominal values (millions of Euros from 1999 on; 
millions of Euros / Italian lire for earlier years) (in Italian: reddito da lavoro 
dependente, RLD). 
ISTAT 
ULD  Number of wage and salary earners, thousands of units; so-called dependent 
labour units (unità di lavoro dipendente). 
ISTAT 
TLT  Total labour tax, social contributions to be paid by employers, current prices   
TWEDGE  The ratio of total labour tax over gross wage and salary earnings = TLT / RLD   
ULT  Total employment, dependent and independent, thousands of units; so-called total 
labour units (unità di lavoro totale). 
ISTAT 
TUD  Trade union density, ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union 
members divided by the total number of wage and salary earners. Data adjusted 
for non-active and self-employed members. 
OCSE 
WR  Real wage = ((RLD / ULD) / CPI).   
LP  Labour productivity = GDPR / ULT.   
WPYE  Labour share = [((RLD / ULD) / CPI) / (GDPR / ULT)] * 100   
 
 